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Classical (trace) conditioning is a speciﬁc variant of associative learning in which a neutral
stimulus leads to the subsequent prediction of an emotionally charged or noxious stimulus
after a temporal gap. When conditioning is concurrent with a distraction task, only partic-
ipants who can report the relationship (the contingency) between stimuli explicitly show
associative learning.This suggests that consciousness is a prerequisite for trace condition-
ing.We review and question three main controversies concerning this view. Firstly, virtually
all animals, even invertebrate sea slugs, show this type of learning; secondly, unconsciously
perceived stimuli may elicit trace conditioning; and thirdly, some vegetative state patients
show trace learning. We discuss and analyze these seemingly contradictory arguments
to ﬁnd the theoretical boundaries of consciousness in classical conditioning.We conclude
that trace conditioning remains one of the best measures to test conscious processing in
the absence of explicit reports.
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INTRODUCTION
Learning comes in many forms. Some forms, such as declara-
tive memory, are explicit memories of objects, places, or events.
Others forms, such as non-declarative memory, are implicit, like
habits, skills, or priming, and do not require conscious aware-
ness (Gilbert et al., 2001; Squire, 2004). While this has been an
established taxonomy of learning, the boundaries are often vague
and difﬁcult to demarcate. For instance, in associative learning
there is a ﬁne-grained distinction between declarative associa-
tive learning, which is dependent on the conscious association
of events, and non-declarative unconscious associative learning,
which occurs without awareness of the link between the related
meaningful events (Shanks, 1995).
In an associative learning task, when two stimuli are systemati-
cally presented in a temporal sequence, a new relationship between
these two items is learned. In classical trace learning, a neutral
conditioning stimulus (CS) precedes and, therefore, causes the
subsequent prediction of an emotionally charged or noxious stim-
ulus (unconditioned stimulus,US; Figure 1). During a differential
eye-blink trace conditioning task, a speciﬁc tone (CS+) warns of
a puff of air to the eye, whereas another tone (CS−) does not. The
presence of an anticipatory eye-blink response, which is a condi-
tioned response (CR) to the CS+ tone, is highly correlated with
participants’ verbal report of the relationship between the stimuli
presented; this is known as the contingency (Dawson and Rear-
don, 1973; Clark and Squire, 1998). In contrast, during a delay
conditioning task, for which there is no gap between the neutral
stimulus (CS) and the puff of air to the eye, blink responses (CR)
are elicited despite the lack of awareness of the contingency (Clark
and Squire, 1998, 1999; Figure 1). Furthermore, trace, but not
delay, conditioning is strongly inﬂuenced by an expectancy of the
US (Clark et al., 2001).
Consequently, delay conditioning has been considered a hall-
mark of non-declarative learning and is systematically used as an
associative learning task in vertebrates and invertebrates (Lavond
et al., 1993). In contrast, human trace learning is dependent on
conscious awareness of the contingency between stimuli (Christ-
ian and Thompson, 2003). Moreover it is this fact that has made
human trace learning a potential “Turing-test” of consciousness
(Koch, 2004).
Though this “turing-test” potential has been inﬂuential in
behavioral neuroscience, three arguments could pose a serious
challenge to this notion: (1) trace conditioning can be learnt
by almost every animal, even invertebrate sea slugs (Glanzman,
1995); (2) trace conditioning can be elicited using subliminal stim-
uli (Esteves et al., 1994); and (3) clinically deﬁned unconscious
patients might learn trace conditioning (Bekinschtein et al., 2009).
It is in addressing these three arguments that we will characterize
the theoretical boundaries of consciousness of learning.
IS CONDITIONING DIFFERENT BETWEEN SEA SLUGS AND
HUMANS?
The evolution of wings can be used as an analogy for the evolution
of conditioning. During the evolution of animals on this planet,
wings appeared at least three times from three different ances-
tors. The ﬁrst appearance was probably 390–320 million years
ago. Primitive wingless insects known as Bristletails used long
antennae-like ﬁlaments at the ends of their bodies to glide down
to tree trunks from forest canopies (Yanoviak et al., 2009). The
second appearance, around 150 million years ago, involved the
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FIGURE 1 | Differential trace (upper graph) and delay conditioning
(lower graph) for the eye-blink task. In trace conditioning there is a silent
period between a tone and a puff of air to the eye. The CS+ tone is
presented for 250ms, followed by a 500-ms silent gap, before a 100-ms
puff of air to the eye (aversive stimulus). A second neutral stimulus tone,
CS−, is presented alone. In delay conditioning, the tone and puff of air
co-occur. The tone lasts for 850ms, covering the silent gap and
co-terminating with the puff of air.
development of wings on dinosaurs. Some dinosaurs started to
evolve lighter skeletons; their wrists changed and feathers grew to
form wings (Lewin, 1983; Sullivan et al., 2010). Though dinosaurs
evolved wings, which gave birth to modern birds their capacity to
ﬂy has a different origin and ancestry than ﬂying insects. The third
appearance of wings developed in bats (Simmons et al., 2008).
This is yet another origin of this feature. Though the three dif-
ferent wings serve a similar function, that is to ﬂy, they were not
derived from a common ancestor. Moreover, they are not con-
trolled by the same machinery, and they do not obey the same
rules.
Is the same true of conditioning? Has a conditioning mecha-
nism appeared only once in evolution? While the well preserved
molecularmachinerymay suggest this,ﬁndings at the systems level
are disparate and may suggest a different conclusion (Barco et al.,
2006). Molecular mechanisms underlying acquisition and consol-
idation of memory are in fact preserved in most species. However,
learning relies on different network mechanisms in humans and
sea slugs (Takehara et al., 2003). The plasticity of arrays of neurons
and the ubiquitous evolutionary pressure of associative learning
makes it extremely difﬁcult to disentangle whether conditioning
emerged only once during the course of evolution. It could be that
conditioning emerged several times from several ancestral sources
just as wings did. We are only left with the certainty that associa-
tive learning can be instantiated in simply a few neurons, as in sea
slugs, or in millions of neurons, as in mammals.
Humans show the highest degree of behavioral ﬂexibility
among animals, probably through a ﬂexible network that relies
on a frontoparietal hub. This ﬂexibility, however, comes at a cost
that results in slow, limited computational capacity. Trace condi-
tioning does not seem to escape from this rule (Zylberberg et al.,
2010). Arbitrary associations in humans are instantiated in this
routing system that appears to be intrinsically related to con-
sciousness (Zylberberg et al., 2011). On the contrary, in the sea slug
these temporary associations may rely on direct connections (Grol
et al., 2006). This may also happen in humans with highly com-
patible sensory–motor relations which bypass the central routing
system (Grol et al., 2006). Trace conditioning in sea slugs, where
consciousness is not required, does not necessarily imply that con-
sciousness does not play a role in human trace conditioning.Alone,
it does not imply more than, for example, a bacteria in need of
oxygen breathing under water makes implications about human
respiration.
Trace conditioning it is also instantiated in neuroanatomically
different systems. The sea slug Aplysia Californica only needs a
few neurons to perform trace conditioning, while rabbits require
hippocampal, frontal cortex, and cerebellar networks (Christian
and Thompson, 2003). In contrast, rabbits seem to be more ﬂex-
ible than gastropods in their learning abilities, but not more than
insects, i.e., fruit ﬂies, (Heisenberg et al., 2001). In humans, as
in rodents, trace conditioning is dependent of the hippocampus
(James et al., 1987;Moyer et al., 1990;Clark andSquire,1998)while
delay conditioning can be elicited without hippocampi (Ivkovich
and Stanton, 2001; Woodruff-Pak and Disterhoft, 2008). Delay
conditioning seems to rely primarily on a functional cerebel-
lum (McCormick and Thompson, 1984; Mauk and Thompson,
1987; Gerwig et al., 2007). Functional imaging studies have shown
that the hippocampus is activated by both trace and delay con-
ditioning, but it is signiﬁcantly more activated by trace (Cheng
et al., 2008). These studies of neuroanatomy and the function of
associative conditioning may indicate declarative memory’s high
dependence on the hippocampi and neocortex, as opposed to non-
declarative memory’s need for these structures, which is minimal
(Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2000).
Further evidence of a causal link between awareness of the
contingency and trace conditioning comes from human and non-
primate mammalian data. In humans the variability in trace
conditioning responses and learning seems to be linked to atten-
tion (Lovibond and Shanks, 2002; Carter et al., 2003), suggesting
a strong modulation by central cognitive processes. In healthy
volunteers, increasing attentional load parametrically modulates
the degree of trace learning (Carter et al., 2003). This elegant
experiment used the classic n-back task to engage attentional
resources and working memory. The engagement of these dra-
matically decreases the anticipatory responses to the US in trace
conditioning. The effect was less prominent for delay condition-
ing. Interestingly, the interference paradigm used in humans to
decrease conditioning has been replicated using mice (Han et al.,
2003), demonstrating a similar functional frontotemporal net-
work supporting successful trace conditioning in a non-primate
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mammalian species. In this study mice heard a tone and received a
foot shock immediately after (delay conditioning) or, alternatively,
the mice received a silent gap between tone and shock (trace con-
ditioning). Two additional groups of mice experienced two lights
ﬂashing as interference for the tone–shock conditions. Learning
was impaired by light interference in trace but not in delay condi-
tioning. In mice the light ﬂashing acted as “cognitive” interference,
just as working memory load might cause interference in trace
conditioning with humans. In both populations, i.e., in humans
and mice, interference effects are found in trace but not delay con-
ditioning. The fact that attention is a key component of conscious
learning and also that trace conditioning is affected by aware-
ness may indicate that trace conditioning is a type of conscious
learning.
IS TRACE CONDITIONING POSSIBLE WHEN STIMULI ARE
UNCONSCIOUSLY PERCEIVED?
There is general agreement that exposure to a contingency between
conditioned stimulus (CS) and US will create an associative
process called conditioning (Dickinson, 1980; Rescorla, 1988). The
difference between human and non-human animal models is that
the former can easily produce a verbal or motor report of the rela-
tionship between the CS and US. If humans can form an internal
representation of the contingency and verbalize it ormake a volun-
tary response, then this behavior is taken as evidence of conscious
awareness (Lovibond and Shanks, 2002).
What if the CS is masked, or more generally, not accessible
to verbal reports? Can a verbal report of the contingency still
be present? This question is central to current theoretical discus-
sions of the role of conscious processing in trace conditioning. Is
conscious awareness of the stimuli needed in order for trace condi-
tioning to occur? There are primarily two models that account for
awareness in trace conditioning. The single-process model, asserts
that a sole propositional learning process mediates expression CR
and the expectancy of US (full network mapping; Lovibond and
Shanks, 2002). The dual-process model, however, claims that these
behavioral responses, both CR expression and US expectancy, are
expressions of two independent learning processes (partial net-
work mapping; Perruchet, 1985; Morris et al., 1999; Perruchet
et al., 2006).
There is empirical evidence championing each model. Some
studies ﬁnd evidence in support of the single-process model
(Daum et al., 1991, 1992; Manns et al., 2000a,b;Weike et al., 2007).
While the series of experiments performed by Perruchet, Destre-
becqz, Cleeremans, and colleagues (Destrebecqz and Cleeremans,
2001; Destrebecqz et al., 2005, 2010; Perruchet et al., 2006) and
experiments performed by others (Ohman and Soares, 1993, 1994,
1998;Ohmanet al., 1995;Weidemannet al., 2009) strongly support
a two-way learning process.
The discussion is centered on the verbal reports of aware-
ness of the contingencies (in Questionnaires, motor evaluation
or subjective ratings) and the measures of CR. There is either
complete agreement or disagreement between the two. This dis-
crepancy raises two relevant methodological aspects about how
to measure the awareness. Firstly, post-training questionnaires
may elicit metacognitive process. Therefore the participant may
verbally report the contingencies, not because they noticed them
during the learning phase, but because they were forced to think
about the contingencies after conditioning had ﬁnished. In this
case it is difﬁcult to know when conscious learning of the rela-
tionship between the stimuli occurred. It could have been during
learning or it could have beenwhen that participant was prompted
about the relationship between stimuli. Secondly, if awareness is
measured online during the experiment, as to avoid a post hoc
metacognitive process, then participants may then take note of the
contingencies of which they were previously unaware. This may
lead to previously unaware participants becoming explicitly aware
of the contingencies. The measurement of both verbal reports of
contingencies and the CR is critical.
In a series of studies, Ohman et al. (1995) and Ohman and
Soares (1993, 1994, 1998) argue that conditioning of electro-
dermal responses to electric shocks can occurwithmasked,uncon-
sciously perceived, stimuli. It has been found that unconsciously
perceived stimuli only elicited a CR when fear-relevant stimuli,
such as spiders and snakes (Ohman and Soares, 1993) or angry
faces (Esteves et al., 1994), were presented as CS+. In support of
Ohman’s claims, one recent study showed that sensitivity to mask-
ing conditions was related to the CR of a masked CS but not an
unmasked CS (Cornwell et al., 2007). In this study, sensitivity to
the masked condition was a marker of unconscious processing,
i.e., if participants were not aware of the masked item then this
was taken to indicate that items were processed at an unconscious
level. The depth of unconscious processing of the CS was linked to
the intensity of the CR. Weak perception of the CS through mask-
ing may not elicit conscious recognition of it, but the CS may still
be above an identiﬁcation threshold. However, there are criticisms
of these ﬁndings.
One criticism is that the measure used to assess perceptual
awareness of the CS may not be sufﬁciently sensitive to identify
participants with residual awareness of stimulus features (Pessoa,
2005; Graziano and Sigman, 2009). Additionally, some fear rele-
vance effects in backward masking conditioning, as observed by
Ohman, could be due to selective sensitization rather than uncon-
scious associative processes. Some methodological concerns have
also been raised concerning the extent to which participants were
truly unaware of the stimuli (Lovibond and Shanks, 2002).Ohman
replied to these criticisms thoroughly, using two main arguments.
Firstly, not all verbal discriminative responses indicate awareness;
discrimination of stimuli above chance levels does not necessarily
imply conscious awareness (Merikle and Daneman, 2000; Wiens
and Ohman, 2002). Secondly, criticisms have assumed that aware-
ness is a conscious experience. Therefore a measure of awareness
must involve a measure of a subjective state.
Another highly debated experiment was performed by Núñez
and de Vicente (2004), they have also showed that CR can be
elicited when masked words are paired with a mild shock, and
that this response is, as it was in the studies by Ohman, related
to the participants’ detection threshold. However, the results of
this study are somewhat difﬁcult to interpret as a higher pro-
portion of participants in the unconscious masked condition
produced a CR than in the conscious group. This study evalu-
ated masked words paired with electric shocks; they used either
a detection threshold, i.e., Was the stimulus a word or a blank?,
or an identiﬁcation threshold, i.e., Was it word1, word2 or not a
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word? When participants failed to detect a stimulus in the tachi-
toscope, half exhibited a CR above learning criterion (four out
of eight). Yet, when participants were above detection threshold
(“conscious”) only 11% (2 of 18) showed learning. There was
a higher instance of conditioning, using a detection threshold,
when stimuli were are presented unconsciously and when CR
was measured using autonomic nervous system signals like skin
conductance. On the contrary, when an identiﬁcation threshold
was applied, i.e., subjects had to differentiate between two words
or two non-words, only 10% (1 of 10 participants) of partici-
pants in the unconscious condition exhibited CR, but 58% (7
out of 12) of participants in the conscious group exhibited CR.
These contradictory results point to two different learning sys-
tems, the unconscious system, which bypasses central processes
and consciousness-related workspaces. It also possibly directly
links the early visual system with the autonomic nervous sys-
tem and the conscious associative system, where the activation
of the frontoparietal cortices may inﬂuence the autonomous ner-
vous system giving rise to a different signal and a different type of
learning. It is indeed the case that the variability, speed, and regu-
larity of the CR was higher in the conscious identiﬁcation group
as compared to the unconscious detection learners (Núñez and de
Vicente, 2004).
There are, however, caveats to this study’s design that must be
considered when discussing the conclusions. Firstly, in the iden-
tiﬁcation threshold condition, words were repeated and could
have therefore been deprived of their meaning. When a word
is repeated it becomes easy to rely on low level features, such
as the letter array, to determine the word’s identity without the
need to access its meaning. The participants’ decisions in this
condition may not have been based on anything more than a
surface features. Another methodological problem of this study
is that the variability of the perceptual threshold was high and
several subjects were therefore excluded leading to a small sam-
ple size. The ﬁnal subgroups of learners were 2/18 and 4/8 for
conscious and unconscious detection of a word/blank, respec-
tively, and 7/12 and 1/10 subjects for conscious and unconscious
identiﬁcation of the word, respectively. The low number of par-
ticipants complicates the statistical analysis and make conclusions
difﬁcult to extrapolate to other cases. Thirdly, there is another
possible explanation of “unconscious conditioning”. When an
electric shock is used as the aversive stimulus, as opposed to a
puff of air to the eye or a loud tone, it may induce a general
increase in arousal. This may, change detection thresholds and act
as a confounding factor, leading to difﬁculty in interpreting the
results.
In short, there seems to be consistent evidence showing that
trace conditioning can also be elicited by unconscious stimuli
with a strong emotional content, which is not accessible for verbal
report. This is reminiscent of the sea slug. There may be some
speciﬁc residual forms of trace learning that can be mediated by
the most likely candidates: unconscious processing and emotional
stimuli. However, evidence of subliminal abstract, non-emotional
stimuli eliciting trace conditioning is not conclusive. Careful and
well-designed experiments are needed to robustly deliminate the
boundaries of consciousness thresholds of stimuli in a given task.
Their ability to elicit trace learning above and below this threshold
should certainly be included in the agenda of highly relevant
experiments in the next years.
DO UNCONSCIOUS PATIENTS SHOW CONDITIONING?
If trace conditioning is taken as an indirect test of awareness, then
a clinically deﬁned unconscious patient, i.e., those in a vegeta-
tive state (VS), that shows CRs (learning) should be considered
conscious. Conversely, if a clinically deﬁned unconscious patient
shows anticipatory responses in trace conditioning, then this
learning may not necessarily be indicative of conscious aware-
ness (Bekinschtein et al., 2009). VS patients are considered to be
unconscious. They lack any behavior consistent with conscious
awareness, such as, they do not follow someone with their eyes
or head across the room, and they do not gesticulate or react
to signs, words or commands. However, we used a classic differ-
ential trace conditioning eye-blink paradigm in 13 VS patients
to investigate whether these unconscious patients might show
learning (Bekinschtein et al., 2009). Moreover, we found a sub-
set of these VS patients did show learning (see Figure 2). Two VS
could appropriately produce CR to CS+ and not to CS−, and
another four patients showed non-discriminatory anticipatory
responses, i.e., producing the CR to both stimuli types. Patients
that demonstrated learning eventually recovered by regaining
awareness, as opposed to those patients that did not show learn-
ing. It is our belief that the patients that showed learning were
partially conscious at the time of testing, but were unable to pro-
duce overt voluntary responses. In a recent trace conditioning
study, using aversive noises and pleasant fanfares measuring skin
conductance response, Scott et al. (2011), showed that only par-
ticipants attending to the stimuli and able to catch the rule of the
experiment showed CRs. If this paradigm is applied in the same
disorders of consciousness patients group as the trace eye-blink
conditioning, it may show convergence in conscious-dependent
learning, and helping to better deﬁne the learning–consciousness
relationship.
It is crucial to consider alternate hypotheses related to trace
conditioning and the limited capacity of consciousness. Limited
capacity implies that to learn trace conditioning, progressive gain
of awareness of the contingency is required by maintaining a free
global workspace clear of other contents (Dehaene and Naccache,
2001). The use of this limited space for other events or processes
may weaken the link that establishes the association between
the CS and the US. This in turn would prevent the associative
relationship from being established.
In our original study the control group for the unconscious
patients were anesthetized participants. These sedated healthy
participants showedno learning of the contingency,orCR, for eye-
blink trace conditioning. The sedative (propofol) that anesthetized
these participants ensured that they were indeed unconscious, and
the levels of drug caused a signiﬁcant decrease in absolute cere-
bral blood ﬂow. In particular the propofol-related variations in the
thalamic bloodﬂowappeared tobe linked to themidbrain reticular
formation, thus suggests a close functional relationship between
the two brain structures while unconscious (Fiset et al., 1999).
These deeply sedated participants showed true unconsciousness
through both diminished awareness and arousal (wakefulness).
Moreover, the participants under low doses of propofol had a
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FIGURE 2 | Anticipatory learning in normal and anesthetized
participants, and in vegetative state patients during trace differential
conditioning. Bars show mean muscle activity for baseline of the CS+(Bs
CS+), CS+ and baseline of the CS−(Bs CS−), CS−. Learning is in arbitrary
units. Sedated subjects show no learning; vegetative state patients, as a
group, show less muscle activity between CS+ and its baseline, and to CS−.
completely disorganized system for global integrated processing
(Davis et al., 2007; Stamatakis et al., 2010).On the contrary,uncon-
scious VS patients show dissociated wakefulness and awareness;
they are regarded as being awake but not aware (Jennett and Plum,
1972). It could be that someVS patients retain partial functionality
of the networks that support the acquisition of trace conditioning,
but this is not enough to produce volitional movements.
CONCLUSION
Sea slugs can learn trace conditioning, but they do not show a form
of learning that reveals the ﬂexibility typically displayed in con-
scious forms of learning (Van den Bussche et al., 2008;Heinemann
et al., 2009; seeDehaene andChangeux,2011 for a review). Instead,
these mollusks use the minimal numbers of systems necessary for
successful associative learning. As far as we know sea slugs are not
conscious, that is they are not conscious in the sameway as humans
are. Hence the mere observation of trace conditioning learning in
this species does not provide evidence that trace conditioning is
not an adequate signature of consciousness.
Quite the opposite is true; humans are extremely sensitive to
context and are continuously interpreting all incoming stimuli
in multiple ways. This capacity for over-interpretation may help
in social interaction, goal-oriented behavior and possibly changes
the way that trace conditioning is encoded and processed. The
expression of trace learning in humans through a display of non-
stereotyped representations of the contingency relies on an entirely
distinct neural architecture. It also seems to rely on overt report in
addition to CR.
Several studies have used masked or subliminally presented
stimuli in order to make CS impossible to report (unconsciously
perceived). This type of design has been used to explicitly deter-
mine whether conscious perception of the stimuli is necessary
to achieve trace learning. Unfortunately, the results are inconclu-
sive about whether trace learning, generally, is achievable through
subliminal stimuli or under some speciﬁc circumstances. A robust
conclusion concerning these studies involves the CS. When it is
not neutral, but of negative valence, the masked stimuli seems to
be processed up to the point of forming an association with the
US, despite not being reported, detected, or discriminated.
The fact that clinically deﬁned unconscious patients show trace
learning suggest that they may have partial capacity for con-
scious awareness, as trace learning is dependant on some form
of conscious awareness of the contingency. This result is further
strengthened by data from sedated participants that show drug
induced unconsciousness does not produce anticipatory responses
above the baseline (Bekinschtein et al., 2009).
Trace conditioning remains very much linked to awareness of
the contingency betweenCS andUS.We believe it is a combination
of the timing between stimuli and the variations on theCS that will
allow us to better frame, over the next few years, the boundaries
between this basic form of learning and conscious awareness.
The aforementioned analyses leads us to propose here three
conditions which should be met in order for trace conditioning
to be used as a test for conscious awareness: (1) a relatively stable,
sustained attention to the stimuli, (2) a low central processing load
to avoid interference and (3) a well deﬁned stimuli, perceptually
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discernible and close in presentation time. If (1) is not met, then
attention will deviate from the stimuli, and the creation of the
association between CS and US will be disrupted. This would lead
to sparse and inconsistent demonstration of the CR (Armony and
Dolan, 2002). If (2) is not met then working memory capacity will
be saturated by another task. Learning will then decrease, and as
a result there will be low awareness of the contingencies. In this
respect, trace conditioning seems to require the central resources
of the attentional system in order for the association to be estab-
lished, and this seems to be paired with awareness (Carter et al.,
2003). If (3) is not met, then the stimuli will be ambiguous and the
trace that is established will not be long-lasting or robust. This will
lead to partial learning only and high variance in CR (Lovibond
and Shanks, 2002; Sehlmeyer et al., 2009).
We would like to raise one ﬁnal important point that has not
yet been emphasized. It is of paramount importance if trace con-
ditioning is to be used in practical terms. Clark and Squire (1998)
established that in order to observe an anticipatory eye-blink
response participants must be aware of the contingency at a level
that is sufﬁcient for a verbal report. The contrary, however, is not
true (both in the original Clark and Squire data and in our data
making more than 200 participants combined): Some participants
show verbal reports of the contingency, but do not show the CR of
an anticipatory associative response. This simply may be because
participants react in different ways to the anticipation of the air
puff when they are aware that it is imminent. The most frequent
reaction is a contraction of the muscle prior to the air puff, how-
ever, some participants may control this spontaneous response
by relaxing and, inhibiting their blinks or by simply doing noth-
ing. Hence, an improved statement is needed. While the absence
of learning does not provide information concerning the partic-
ipants’ degree of awareness; the contrary is true. The presence
of trace learning may be taken as evidence in favor of conscious
awareness.
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